Pavlov Scope

2005 December 31

WMF Exploit (Update 1)

Filed under: ITSec — Kev Frey @ 1:07:31

Hi again;

As more information has surfaced about this problem, the vulnerability has spread to other extensions. The reason for this is that an attacker can disguise these kinds of files as other image files (like JPG, GIF, BMP, etc.). Windows renders (opens/runs) the file based on its file header information, not as its extension (like the “old” days ;-)

Additionally, SANS has discovered an issue with spefically with Lotus Notes (a groupware / email system my organization, and thousands others use) that makes it more vulnerable to this exploit than Microsoft clients (in sharp contrast to the usual, opposite condition). The primary workaround, until Lotus and/or Microsoft fixes this problem is to filter all image file types from inbound Internet email.

However, since the virus vendors are staying on top of this, filtering the image files is probably too disruptive at this time.

However, this situation could change if a new attack method is released.

Best regards and Happy New Year!

_____________________________________________________________
KevFrey

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2005 December 29

“Be Careful Out There” - 20051229 - WMF 0day exploit

Filed under: ITSec — FreyGuy @ 16:06:31

Hi all;

A new vulnerability has been found in a Windows application and it is now being exploited in the “wild.”

Background

    WMF and EMF files are Windows-specific image (graphics) file types and are the underlying formats used for images in Office and Windows ( e.g. When you take a screenshot, this is saved “under the hood” as a WMF on the clipboard).

    WMF stands for Windows MetaFile and EMF stands for Enhanced MetaFile. Unlike GIF, JPEG, TIF, etc., WMF graphics are generally not compatible with platforms other than Windows (UNIX, non-IE browsers, etc. cannot natively render them).

The Problem

    A new, as-yet-unpatched vulnerability has been discovered in the way that the “Windows Picture and Fax viewer” application handles WMF (and potentially EMF) files.

    Additionally, a new exploit against this flaw has been released that drops a Trojan, spyware, and other malicious software onto the machine when compromised.

    Operating Systems currently affected: Windows XP Pro, XP Home, and 2003 Server (all versions).

    This format has been particularly troublesome for Microsoft in the past since the company has had to patch this component 3 times in the past 2 years, most recently in the November monthly patch cycle.

Workarounds

    Until a fix is released by Microsoft, there are some mitigating actions and workarounds to take in order to protect yourself from this problem.

    1. I recommend configuring your personal (and company) email software to block WMF and EMF extension attachments.
    2. Do NOT open any WMF files you encounter while surfing (WMF files are not Internet-compatible, so encountering them is rare – but stay alert).
      Use a broswer other than Internet Explorer (Opera, Firefox, etc. will not “automatically” open these WMF files but will instead prompt you – and respond NO or CANCEL if you do see any).
    3. Trend Micro (an antivirus vendor) is already blocking the known variants of the Trojan currently using this exploit. Trend detects the Trojan as “TROJ_NASCENE.x” where x is the variant revision (as of this message there are four known variants of this trojan). Symantec lists it as Bloodhound.Exploit.56. McAfee is listing it as, quite simply, Exploit-WMF. Kaspersky has sent out updates. Sophos has multiple names for the variants, but has also released updates for these trojans.
      At any rate, the point here is that most AV vendors are protecting against the known attacks against this exploit, so UPDATE whatever antivirus software you use and, in general, make sure you set it to update daily (although I prefer hourly if it is available on your software).
    4. “Divorce” the Windows Picture and Fax viewer from rendering WMF and EMF file types. Given 1) and 2) above, this fairly drastic and intrusive step is unnecessary to protect us at this time. Note, however, that if you have another graphics application (like infranview, Lview, iview, acdsee, etc.) set to open WMF and EMF files, then you are at much less risk since the vulnerability is in the built-in default Windows Picture and Fax view application.

Eventual Solution

    Once Microsoft releases a patch for this flaw, we will deploy it using the usual Automatic Updates method.

FYI;

_____________________________________________________________
KevFrey

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“Personally I’m always ready to learn, although I do not always like being taught.” – Sir Winston Churchill

2005 December 21

Symantec buffer overflow vulnerability

Filed under: ITSec — Kev Frey @ 12:51:31

Hi all;

An as-yet-unpatched vulnerability has been discovered in a file used by many different Symantec (Norton) products for scanning RAR archive compression files ( RAR is a competing file compression technique to highly successful ZIP).

The workaround suggested both by the researcher discovering the flaw and by the vendor is to configure the antivirus software to prevent scanning of RAR files and to setup a mail filter in email client or email server software to prevent the possibility of a vulnerable Symantec product from scanning a malicious RAR file.

Many people use Norton/Symantec antivirus products on their home or work computers, so I wanted to “get the word out” if you or those you know might be affected by this – especially considering the holiday season coming up which will provide hackers more time to craft attacks against the software. Feel free to forward this email to those you know that you feel might be affected by this problem.

No word yet on when a patch will be released to fix the problem, but I suggest that those that believe they are affected:

  1. Disable the scanning of RAR files in the antivirus software configuration.
  2. Create mail filter rules to delete incoming messages with RAR file attachments.
  3. Watch the Symantec security advisories page for details
  4. Download and install all new patches via the LiveUpdate utility included with Symantec products (watch for a forthcoming update).

As of this message, Symantec has not publicly acknowledged the issue on this aforementioned site, but it is no doubt being investigated and pending.

Original information from the person that discovered the problem:

Security Advisory – Symantec Antivirus Library RemØte Heap Overflows

Date: December 20, 2005

Vulnerability

The Symantec Antivirus Library provides file format support for virus analysis. During decompression of RAR files Symantec is vulnerable to multiple heap overflows allowing attackers complete control of the system(s) being protected. These vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely without user interaction in default configurations through common protocols such as SMTP.

Impact

Successful exploitation of Symantec protected systems allows attackers unauthorized control of data and related privileges. It also provides leverage for further network compromise. Symantec implementations are likely vulnerable in their default configuration. In default configurations users are likely vulnerable regardless of whether they choose to open or read the email.

Affected Products

Due to the library’s modular design and core functionality; it is likely this vulnerability affects a substantial portion of Symantec’s gateway, server, & client antivirus-enabled product lines on most platforms. In fact, the scope of this vulnerability is likely similar to the one described in this link and also includes more current versions.

Further, this library is also licensed to a substantial number of venders with products/services that are likely affected. A small sample of these vendors can be found here.

Recommendation

Disable scanning of RAR compressed files until the vulnerable code is fixed.

Credit

This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Alex Wheeler.

Technical overview

The vulnerable code is responsible for decompression of RAR archive formats. Specifically, the vulnerability is the result of unchecked 16bit length fields in RAR sub-block header types. An attacker may craft a sub-block header to overwrite heap memory with user controlled file data to execute arbitrary code. Successful attack will yield system/root level privileges and is available through e-mail without user interaction.

The module affected resides in Dec2Rar.dll v3.2.14.3. It’s probable other versions are affected as well.

Original Reference: http://www.rem0te.com/public/images/symc2.pdf

If you have any questions, please feel free to ask.

Seasons Greetings and take care;

_____________________________________________________________
KevFrey

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2005 December 13

KB905915 / MS05-054

Filed under: ITSec — Kev Frey @ 16:30:31

Microsoft has released the patches for this (and the other recently reported bugs) earlier this afternoon (2005-Dec-13).

I will be testing these patches out in my testbed tonight to make sure they don’t break the OS (worse than the workaround)... but I recommend that everyone (read:personal/home computers) visit the Windows Update site which you must use IE to access – you might have to add *.microsoft.com into the Trusted Zones area if you have put the workaround in place. Or, you can usually just use the “Start button – Windows Update” link as well.

If your professional (read:work/job) organization isn’t deploying these patches or doesn’t have a patch management solution in place, I would also recommend updating your work computer in the same way… but if your company/organization does update your software for you, you might be throwing a monkey wrench into things.

If you have questions or problems, please let me know.

Please be aware that there have been reports that this update breaks computers running IE7 (beta) in parallel with IE6, so for all you tinkerers out there, heed.

_____________________________________________________________
KevFrey

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